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TO EVERY THING THERE IS A SEASON AND A 
TIME TO EVERY PURPOSE UNDER THE 
HEAVEN – A TIME TO BE BORN AND A TIME TO 
DIE.
1
 NATURAL LAW, EMOTION AND THE 








Here we will discuss the „right to die‟; should a person, in certain 
circumstances, lawfully be able to call upon the assistance of another to bring 
their life to an end? The proposal is that the answer should be „yes‟ , but the 
novelty of this essay is in its argument that such an answer can be provided by 
a „natural lawyer‟ - which is to say a person who believes that law has some 
minimal, inescapable, moral content. This answer is quite contrary to that 
proposed by Professor John Finnis, the leading modern exponent of natural 
law theory. The matter is of particular relevance because of the recent death of 
Tony Nicklinson who unsuccessfully sought a Declaration that a doctor would 
not face prosecution for giving him a lethal injection. The High Court 
declined to issue such an order saying that Parliament would need to give 
specific statutory authority for such a step.
2
 A draft statute is provided near 
the end of the article in order to stimulate supply of the High Court‟s request. 
The practical argument herein is therefore addressed, at least in part, to 
Parliament, but the criticism of John Finnis‟ theory will, it is hoped, appeal to 
an academic audience. This article aims to restore emotion to its proper place 
                                                   
1 Ecclesiastes 3:1. Ecclesiastes (Hebrew - Qoheleth), which must not be confused with 
Ecclesiasticus (Sirach), is an ancient book of philosophy of disputed authorship and 
provenance included in the Christian Bible. The burden of the text is that life is 
bounded by birth and death, there being no after-life, and life has no extrinsic 
meaning; these views are incompatible with the generally understood doctrines of 
Christianity and are those held by the author.  
 R AWatt, BA, BCL, PhD; Professor of Law, University of Buckingham, Hunter St 
Buckingham MK18 1EG. I am grateful to Giovanni Agrusti, Dr Phil Larkin, Dr 
Graham Melling, Dr Sarah Sargent, Tim Sinnamon, the Editor, and the anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments. None of them should be taken as supporting, 
endorsing or, for that matter, opposing the arguments set out herein.  
2
 [2012] EWHC 2381. 
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as a tool for evaluating human practice,
3
 and thus claim that emotion has a 
place alongside reason as a basis for law as an institution, the drafting of 
particular laws, and adjudication. Reference to poetry, music, and myth are 
used in order to illustrate the claim that humans are uniquely emotional beings 
and to illustrate the argument being made.. These are not idiosyncratic „add-
ons‟; in an ideal world all of the music and poetry would have been embedded 
in the text of the article because they communicate some of the ideas herein 
more effectively than discursive argument.
4
 The reader is urged to listen to all 
the music and to read the poems and myth in their entirety. Furthermore 
lawyers and philosophers are trained to analyse words; the words of the poetry 
and music are not of paramount importance. The reader is asked instead to 
consider the affect raised. 
There is an essential preliminary point. Some readers may be surprised to 
find that this article does not contain a detailed analysis of the Nicklinson 
decision. This must be explained. Tony Nicklinson was obliged to bring this 
matter to court because he was anxious to avoid prosecution of any physician 
for bringing his life to a swift, peaceful, and painless end in accordance with 
his wishes. The courts, however, are creatures of reason and precedent and are 
unable to consider questions of emotion.
5
 Since Tony Nicklinson‟s argument 
was founded upon matters which judges qua judges are precluded from 
considering,
6
 it is unsurprising that the decision is little more than a recitation 
of the law as it presently stands. The novelty is in the referral to parliament 
and this is addressed below.  
                                                   
3 A project also undertaken by Michael Stocker who, with Elizabeth Hegeman, is 
“concerned to normalize and rescue emotions, and to show that they enjoy secure and 
respectable connections with value, in part because of their important cognitive, 
evaluative and desiderative content.‟ See Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
Henceforth VE. The quotation is from p 6. 
4 Stocker VE above n 3, p 6 makes a similar stylistic point. 
5 See the strong statement expressing this view in another context by Atkin LJ in 
Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2KB 571 at 579 “The common law does not regulate the 
form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and 
sealing wax. The consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love and 
affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts.” 
6 As they were precluded from commenting upon behaviour in Re Agar-Ellis (1883) 
24 Ch D 317, see Bowen LJ at 335: „This is a case in which, if we were not in a Court 
of Law, but in a court of critics capable of being moved by feelings of favour or 
disfavour, we might be tempted to comment, with more or less severity, upon the way 
in which, so far as we have heard the story, the father has exercised his parental 
rights.” 
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 whether consciously or not, concedes John Mackie‟s central 
claim
9
 that there are no objective moral values “out there”. It would be very 
queer,
10
 if, whilst running through the Buckinghamshire countryside, we were 
to come upon a „good‟ or an „evil‟ in the same way as we might come upon a 
sheep or even, as at Maids Moreton, an alpaca. Surely no one now thinks that 
there are Forms awaiting discovery somewhere outside our present shadowy 
cave.
11
 We can take it that Finnis has a true aim when he writes that there are 
“human goods” and one cannot produce an adequate theory of law unless one 
“participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really good 
for human persons”.12 “Goods” – things to be desired and actively sought - 
and “evils” – things to be shunned - exist only in the human mind as abstract 
concepts against which we evaluate our “actions, practices, habits, 
dispositions and ... discourse”13 and thus, at some time, our ancestors must 
have invented them or they must have evolved in our ascent from lowlier 
forms of life. This is not to claim that they engaged in some definite act of 
creation from nothing, or that they sat down on some dank afternoon and 
exhaustively defined good and evil. Law, as a uniquely human institution, 
must depend to some extent upon our nature. Hence part of the claim is that, 
and here Finnis would agree, there are identifiable human goods which stem 
from our nature as human persons.
14
 The quarrel with Finnis stems from the 
fact that he seems to have ducked an important second order question. He has 
                                                   
7 The remark is attributed to Aneurin Bevan and is alleged to have been directed at 
Hugh Gaitskell. 
8 In J Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) (Henceforth 
NLNR). There is a famous comment made by John Mackie in Ethics: inventing right 
and wrong in which he praises those with whom he disagrees; see p.10 and the 
Obituary Notice in The University College Record. May I echo that remark, and say 
that my comments on others‟ work, which I trust are not barbed, are offered in a spirit 
of respectful, scholarly dispute? 
9 See J L Mackie Ethics; inventing right and wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). 
(Henceforth EIRW). 
10 Mackie EIRW above n 9, pp 38-42, section headed “The argument from queerness”.  
11 The influence of Platonic thought on the development of modern natural law theory 
will be considered below. It will be argued that Plato and Aristotle have cast a long 
shadow. Stocker, VE above n4, at p 7 takes a different view of Aristotle arguing that 
his work places “affectful emotions” and “psychological concerns” at the centre of his 
ethical views. 
12 Finnis NLNR above n 8, p 4. 
13 Finnis NLNR above n 8, p 4. 
14
 See his discussion in NLNR above n 8, p 34. 
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identified “goods”, but on the basis of a thin, or one dimensional, conception 
of humanity; he has failed adequately to address the question of humanity. 
This is a fatal omission: how can one possibly expound a doctrine of natural 
law - that which is good for humankind - unless one explores the nature of 
humankind? The central reason for Finnis‟s reluctance so to do is his 
exclusive (or better – exclusionary) adherence to a neo-Stoic conception of 
humankind in which the good life is recognised by reason. 
15
 Cicero‟s adage 
“True law is right reason in accordance with nature” would provide a fitting 
epigraph to Finnis‟ book when one notices that in the following passage it is 
clear that Cicero sees reason as the mechanism whereby humankind discerns 
the order, or way of life, which God put into the universe.
16
 If one rejects 
Cicero‟s and Finnis‟ theism one is obliged to seek value in some other source. 
Here emotion is seen as the source of value. 
 
(a) Natural law – some analytical preliminaries. 
 
There are some important, preliminary points to be made. The concept of 
„natural law‟ is used in the sense that law must, in order to serve the purposes 
of mortal (the word is of vital importance) humankind,
17
 contain definite 
substantive principles, “the truth of which is contingent on human beings and 
the world they live retaining the salient characteristics which they have.”18 By 
natural law is meant, the law by which humans ought to live so that, in 
accordance with their own nature as human, they may thrive as individuals 
and as the ζώον πολιτικόν, the animal which lives in society. It is our job, 
whether as legislators, lawyers, academics or ordinary citizens and voters, to 
participate in the debate about making law.
19
  
Second, the practice of law in its widest sense has two distinct 
components which are relevant to this article – legislating and judging. 
Regarding legislation, analytical jurists have explained that law (legislation or 
quasi-legislation) is a system of norms (ought statements) whose function is to 
provide pre-emptive and exclusionary advice as to how we should behave in 
                                                   
15 Finnis NLNR above n 8, pp 371-410, especially pp 374-379. 
16 Cicero De Republica III. 22 
17 See A Local Authority v E and Others [2012] EWHC 1639, para 137 per Jackson J 
“We only live once – we are born once and we die once – and the difference between 
life and death is the biggest difference we know.” 
18 H L A Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961) p 195.  
19 See the discussion in NLNR above n 8, pp 371-378, and the alternative reasoning 
set out below. It will be argued that H L A Hart‟s discussion in The Concept of Law 
above n 11, The Minimum Content of Natural Law, pp 189-195, is a useful, although 
incomplete, starting point. 
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order, primarily, to avoid a sanction.
20
 It is important to note that law as a 
system of norms is directed to governing behaviour; those statements aimed at 
involuntary status (such as the apartheid “laws” of the Republic of South 
Africa or the Nazi Nuremburg “laws”) may have been contained in 
legislation, but they were not “laws”. They are a species of command - „kill 
Jews‟ is repugnant shorthand for the Nuremburg commands. No matter what a 
black person or a Jew did, s/he would still be subjected to tyranny. It seems 
that norms (or laws properly so-called) may logically fall into one of six 
categories. 
 
1) A norm may be properly drafted such that it may reliably guide 
human behaviour into performing action which is consistent with 
human ends. (A perfect norm.) 
2) A norm may be intended to guide human behaviour into performing 
action which is consistent with human ends, but is poorly drafted. (A 
faulty norm.) 
3) A norm may be intended to guide human behaviour into performing 
action which is inconsistent with human ends and is properly drafted. 
(A false norm.) 
4) A norm may be intended to guide human behaviour into performing 
action which is inconsistent with human ends and is poorly drafted. 
(A faulty false norm). 
5) A norm may have no effect on human ends and is properly drafted 
(For example – a norm which requires potatoes to be sold by the 
kilogram or pound; - a regulatory norm.) 
6) A norm may have no effect on human ends and is poorly drafted. (A 
faulty regulatory norm.) 
 
In this article we are only concerned with the relationship between 1) 
Perfect norms and 3) False norms. All faulty norms (numbers 2), 4), 6)) may 
be repaired, and the regulatory norms 5) and 6) may fall completely outside 
the scope of the analysis but, in any event, they will not concern us here. 
We have no reason to doubt that both perfect norms and false norms are 
both amenable and subject to the ordinary processes of the courts; the 
processes of judgment. If we select that which Professor Finnis would 
undoubtedly claim to be, a false norm,
21
 the Abortion Act 1976, we can see 
that the Act can be explored and analysed by the courts. The latest case being 
Mary Teresa Doogan & Concepta Wood, Petitioners for Judicial Review of a 
                                                   
20 Joseph Raz “The Authority of Law” in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 
1988). 
21 There is no comment on this claim in this article. It will be fully explored in 
subsequent articles.  
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decision of Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board.
22
  This case explores 
the extent or definition of part of a norm contained in the Act. An earlier case 
which explores the application of another of the constituent norms is Re SS 
(An Adult: Medical treatment).
23
  These cases demonstrate that the handling 
of potentially false norms by courts does not necessarily differ from the 
treatment of perfect norms at the level of judgment. A judge‟s duty is, of 
course, to give judgment according to the law. The same judge may, qua 
private citizen, believe that the law is wrong. The judge as citizen may think 
that permitting abortion under the 1967 Act is a false norm, but it is by no 
means certain that s/he does so on rational grounds, any more than it is certain 
that those opposed to abortion who rely upon s4 (1) – the conscience clause – 
of the 1967 Act are opposed to it on rational grounds; they may simply feel 
revolted by the idea of, as they see it, participating in the death of a child. In 
plain words, the falsity of a norm is judged by applying standards which 
include the rational, but which may include other standards. Judges are bound 
to apply the law which is prima facie a coherent system of reason, but the law 
itself may be judged. In the case of abortion the law allows potential 
participants to recuse themselves in certain cases,
24
 by means of their 
emotional judgement. Parliament recognised in passing the 1967 Act that it 
could not rightly force people to behave against their own feelings in such a 
sensitive matter. Parliament as legislator acknowledged that people behave as 
whole beings in both acting and judging. It seems strange to do otherwise. 
Thirdly, and this point flows from the second, the serious question of 
moral philosophy is, as Benn and Peters point out, the question of the 
rightness of rules.
25
 Benn and Peters assert that we can measure the rightness 
or otherwise of a rule by the effect upon the interests of others. However, 
people do not just consider the interests of others when they act. They 
consider their own interests and, more importantly, they consider themselves 
and others simpliciter. They do not act to benefit another or themselves in any 
                                                   
22 [2012] CSOH 32. 
23 [2001] All ER(D) 220. 
24 A justification of the circumstances in which they cannot recuse themselves, as set 
out in s 4(2) of the 1967 Act is supposedly provided by the doctrine of „double effect‟ 
in which the unwilling abortionist is said to think “I am not killing the baby because I 
do not desire to kill the baby; I am saving the life of the mother.” The present author 
does not accept that this is a rational doctrine (although it is a very powerful 
emotional one and, accordingly, both valuable and acceptable). It is a doctrine akin to 
that which leads to the apocryphal story that members of a firing squad are issued with 
one blank bullet so that those who wish so to do may convince themselves that they 
did not participate in the killing. The doctrine of double effect is further explored 
below. 
25 S I Benn and R S Peters Social Principles and the Democratic State (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1959) p 32. 
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specific way; in the best of circumstances they act out of love for another, in 




The aim of this article is to use a richer and more accurate conception of 
humanity in order to explore one of Finnis‟ goods; that of life.26 There is no 
question that, in the sunny daylight, life is anything less than a good; however 
as the shadows lengthen (for whatever reason) life may become an evil.
27
 In 
accordance with Finnis‟ powerful statements, this can only be understood by 
those who participate in the work of evaluation; but this evaluation needs to 
be undertaken by a whole person.  
To start this task of rehabilitating emotion a setting of poetry to music will 
be used as an example of the way in which continued life may be seen as an 
evil rather than a good. The device of “lengthening shadows” in the earlier 
paragraph was chosen because of its resonance with “At Gloaming”, Im 
Abendrot, in the setting of Joseph von Eichendorff‟s poem to the last of 
Richard Strauss‟ Four Last Songs.28 
 
We have gone through sorrow and joy hand in hand. 
Now we can rest from our wandering above the quiet land. 
 
Around us, the valleys bow; the air is growing darker. 
                                                   
26 Subsequent works will explore some of Finnis‟ other goods and, indeed, his other 
arguments as to the nature of a good. These essays will, as in this case, produce some 
conclusions which differ radically from those which he reaches. 
27 The almost poetic quality of Justice Steffen‟s words in McKay v Bergstedt (1990) 
801 P ed 617 (Nevada Supreme Ct.) 2 at p 5 are worthy of note: “One of the verities 
of human experience is that all life will eventually end in death. As the seasons of life 
progress through spring, summer and fall, to the winter of our years, the expression 
unknown to youth is often heard evincing the wish to one night pass away in the midst 
of a peaceful sleep. It would appear, however, that as the scientific community 
continues to increase human longevity and promote “the greying of America” 
prospects for slipping away during peaceful slumber are decreasing. And for 
significant numbers of citizens like Kenneth, misfortune may rob life of much of its 
quality long before the onset of winter.” This passage is quoted quite poignantly by 
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P at para [29] of Ms B v An NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 
429. We will return to this theme at the end of the article with a quotation from Rupert 
Brooke‟s Choriambics I. 
28 For ease of listening view http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ppoqUVlKkBU . In 
order fully to appreciate the point the reader is urged to listen to Herbert von 
Karajan‟s recording with Gundula Janowitz and the Berliner Philharmoniker. 
Deutsche Grammophon 447 422-2. 
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Just two skylarks soar upwards dreamily into the fragrant air. 
Come close to me, and let them flutter. Soon it will be time for sleep. 
Let us not lose our way in this solitude. 
 
O vast, tranquil peace, so deep at sunset! How weary we are of 
wandering --- Is this perhaps death?  
 
Arguably the third of the Songs, a setting of Hermann Hesse‟s “Going to 
Sleep”, Beim Schlafengehen provides a stronger text, but it lacks the power of 
the final dusky chords on the strings lifted by the trills on the flute. 
29
 The 
point is important because it demonstrates that words, often the vehicle of 
reason, lack the communicative power of music which appeals to us upon an 
emotional level. This is the point made in the introduction to this essay. It is 
not to say that music lacks reason; indeed it has its own internal logic 
demonstrated by the art of the great composers. The rational or technical art of 
composition is the conveyance of emotion, but it is the emotion which affects 
the ordinary listener. 
The charge is that John Finnis elevates the place of reason as the driving 
force of human action, which to say practical reason, to a position far beyond 
that which it does occupy and that which it should occupy. Despite the fact 
that he is well aware of the fact that reason may be perverted, in, for example, 
the schemes of mass-murderers;
30
 he seems to insist that one can grasp 
“(f)rom one‟s capacity to grasp intelligently the basic forms of good as „to-be-
pursued‟” and amongst these forms of basic good is “Life”.31 The argument 
against him is that it is not at all clear that the good of life is either to be 
“grasped intelligently” in all circumstances, and, indeed, whether 
“intelligence” is the best or even the most appropriate way of ascertaining the 
good of life. The point is that it has been appreciated, at least since the time of 
Plato, that human perception and action is not solely based upon reason. 
Whilst Plato and many of those following him elevated reason to the highest 
position in human understanding, the most appropriate basis for action, and 
the foundation of judgement, it is not clear that this is invariably correct. 
                                                   
29 The idea of approaching death approaching is first raised in the second of the Songs 
„September‟, but the present author finds that particular song unnecessarily miserable. 
If we need a song about September, Kurt Weill and Maxwell Anderson‟s September 
Song recorded by Ella Fitzgerald and Paul Smith on Verve Jazz ‘Round Midnight 511 
035-2 is much to be preferred. We are not considering the September of a person‟s life 
in this article; we are considering the cold, bleak end of December after all joy has 
departed. 
30 Finnis NLNR above n 8, p 134. 
31 Finnis NLNR above n 8, pp 85-86. 
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Humankind is not composed of desiccated calculating machines, and it would 
be much the poorer if that were to be the case. 
 
THE WHOLE PERSON 
 
Herbert Hart has rightly recognised that men are neither devils nor 
angels;
32
 clearly too they are neither calculating machines, nor beasts ruled 
solely by instincts and passions. Plato pointed out in The Republic
33
 that one 
might think that the human soul was divided into two parts - the rational and 
the appetitive – but closer examination led one to further divide the appetitive 
soul into the spirited soul, in which were located the emotions, and the (true) 
appetitive in which were located the basic desires. Plato uses the person and 
the city state as mutual similes or models and claims that the state should be 
ruled by the wise, the rational Guardians, supported by the spirited 
technocrats, and they should keep the base workers in check. Rationality or 
reason is seen as the philosopher –king at the level of both the individual and 
the polis. 
The problem with reason is, as we have seen Finnis points out,
34
 that the 
most highly rational operations such as the drafting of complex train 
timetables by, eg, Adolf Eichmann, to send people to extermination camps 
mask the most hideous evils. We do not blame such people for being 
irrational, for we can see the perverse rationality of their actions. We are 
sickened by them at a visceral level; we view them as cruel and „heartless‟. 
The notion that the heart is the seat of emotions is not due to the purveyors of 
modern Valentine cards, but is of ancient origin. We can weigh emotions 
almost instinctively, because emotionality – the capacity to feel emotion- is 
one that all people save the psychopath share. 
It is thus suggested that the proper tool for weighing emotion is itself 
emotion. Attempts have been made to weigh emotion by means of reason, but 
this has produced some grotesque answers. Aristotle tries to claim that sex, as 
an example of the licentious pleasure of touch, is part of our low, brutish, 
animal nature.
35
 This is simply silly, for a reason pointed out by Jacob 
Bronowski in his brilliant The Ascent of Man. Bronowski writes:
36
 
                                                   
32 Hart above n 13, p 191. 
33 Plato The Republic, University of Pennsylvania e-publication 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/plato/republic.pdf 
Ed J Manis. See Book 4, the Dialogue between Plato and Glaucon pp 84-85 
34 Above n 15. 
35 Aristotle Ethics (London: Penguin, trans. Thompson rev. 1976) III8b. 
36 And in the sense that a picture paints a thousand words, he illustrates his point with 
pictures of the great rationalists James Watson, Marie Curie, Louis Pasteur, Albert 
Einstein, Ludwig Boltzmann, Max Born, Niels Bohr and John Von Neumann with 
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Most of the world‟s literature, most of the world‟s art, is preoccupied 
with the theme of boy meets girl. We tend to think of this as a sexual 
preoccupation that needs no explanation. But I think that is a mistake. 
…Sex was invented as a biological instrument by (say) the green 
algae. But as an instrument in the ascent of man which is basic to his 
cultural evolution, it was invented by man himself. 
Spiritual and carnal love are inseparable. A poem by John Donne says 
that: he called it The Extasie, …37 
 
Following this we can easily say, for example, “Death was invented as a 
biological instrument by (say) the sponges or the jellyfish. But as an 
instrument in the ascent of man which is basic to his cultural evolution, it was 
invented by man himself.” Death is not only a physical and a cultural 
phenomenon, it is also an emotional one which is not reducible to reason.  
Emotion is immediately affective and is not mediated or reducible to reason.
38
 
We have seen above the words to Im Abendrot, which we may take as an 
example of the cultural significance of death. Amoebae, which divide by 
binary fission and thus cannot be said to undergo a normal death would have 
no grasp of the significance of the „vast tranquil peace‟ of sunset and would 
not (if they were able to) bother to write the poem or compose the music.
39
 
Indeed it might be that as much of our culture would disappear if we 
abolished death as if we had abolished sex. More importantly for our present 
purposes, imagine the effect upon our inner world if we abolished sex and 
death; we would have no need and no place for the emotions of love or grief. 
Human „death behaviour‟ is as far removed from animal „death behaviour‟ as 
human lovemaking is from animal rutting. 
The fundamentally simple claim is that we can only understand death as a 
human phenomenon by means of its emotional significance. We certainly do 
not fully understand it by means of reason, although much of our mythology 
                                                                                                                         
their (intended) spouses. See below n 37, p 406 ff Perhaps the present author is a 
sentimentalist, but the song If written by Paul Heaton, Scott Shields and Martin 
Slattery expresses the emotion more clearly than argument. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jHeW8nPBcA&feature=related . 
37 Jacob Bronowski The Ascent of Man (London: BCA/BBC; 1977) p 406. There is 
insufficient space to quote the 500 words of Donne‟s poem here. Readers are 
recommended to read it at http://www.luminarium.org/sevenlit/donne/ecstacy.htm . 
38 Stocker V E see pp 38-51. Argument in favour of this assertion is set out below.  
39 A similar point is made by Ludwig Wittgenstein when he observed that “If a lion 
could speak, we would not be able to understand it”. Duncan Richter in his essay 
entitled “Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889-1951” http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/ draws 
attention to the fact that emotionality is an important element in the formation of 
values. 
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is devoted to attempting just that impossible feat. We can certainly understand 
death as a biological process, as a social process with legal consequences, and 
we can reliably predict the emotional consequences and their physical results; 
but we do not cry any the less at the death of a loved one. The interesting 
point is that the overwhelming majority of readers understand the point 
exactly. We mourn because we understand, at an emotional level, the sadness 
of death; we can understand and weigh emotions because we share them.  Our 
understandings of The Extasie and Im Abendrot grow as we experience love 
(with its physical and emotional faces) and the death of, for example, our 
parents.  The bringing together of love and death in Im Abendrot, which 
Richard Strauss wrote for himself and his long-time wife, the soprano Pauline 
de Ahna; or Ovid‟s story of Baucis and Philemon40 allow us to contemplate, 
or emotionally rehearse, our own death and that of our spouse.  Humankind 
can, and does, communicate its emotional life within its membership and the 
overwhelming majority of humanity has stories which allow us to share these 
feelings. Arthur Schopenhauer in his work on religion points out that religion 
purports to provide an explanation and, where necessary, consolation for the 
vicissitudes of life; most importantly an understanding of death.
41
 Humankind, 
perhaps uniquely amongst the animals, communicates and feels the emotion 
of our fellows. We have no evidence that any other creature is empathic, and 
we are certain that no other creature is empathic in the same way. To admit 
Plato‟s claim that such humanity is a feature of our more primitive, appetitive, 
soul is erroneous.  
Even Marxist theoreticians, for all their insistence upon rational scientific 





Men are not divided into a degraded material and a higher spiritual 
part, and need no supernatural help or guidance. Yet their needs are 
not confined to material needs in the sense of requirements for the 
biological functioning of human bodies and the continuation of the 
species. The characteristic human need is for personal relations with 
other people. People need human companionship, sympathy, 
assistance and co-operation first of all to produce together the material 
means of life and then, on that basis to develop and enjoy the activities 
and fruits of human culture. While none of this is possible unless 
elementary material needs are satisfied (so that to preach that material 
                                                   
40 Ovid, Metamorphoses VIII. 
41 See, generally, Arthur Schopenhauer Religion: a Dialogue, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10833  
42 M Cornforth Communism and Human Values (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972) 
p 35. 
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satisfactions are worthless in comparison with “spiritual” ones is 
utterly repugnant to the development of human needs and human 
personality), the material needs of men are themselves humanised and 
transformed into specifically human as distinct from animal needs. 
Thus people do not simply need food but need it artfully prepared and 
served, they do not simply need clothing and shelter but fashions and 
architecture, and they do not simply need sexual intercourse, but the 
art of love and human relations between the sexes. 
 
Let us now consider the relation between reason and emotion. Some 
writers take the view that emotions are reasons. Indeed they are, but of a very 
special sort. This is best elucidated by examining Joseph Raz‟s view of 




As well as reasons for action there are reasons for beliefs, for desires 
and emotions, for attitudes, for norms and institutions and many 
others. Of these reasons for action and for belief are the most 
fundamental types of reasons, the others being derived from or 
dependent upon them. 
Reasons are referred to in explaining, in evaluating and guiding 
people‟s behaviour. The concept of a reason is used for various other 
purposes as well, but these three are primary and the rest are derived 
from or dependent on them For example, we say on the appropriate 
occasion that John married Mary for her money, that people should 
marry for love only and that therefore since John acted for the wrong 
reasons he behaved badly and Derek should not do the same. 
 
The first disagreement with this text is with the sentence “Of these reasons 
for action and belief are the most fundamental types of reasons, the others 
being derived from or dependent upon them.” If this text is understood 
correctly, it seems that Raz‟s own example contradicts his text; and reflects, 
instead, the position being taken here. The act of marrying is acting for a 
reason; marrying for love is acting on the reason of an emotion, and we judge 
it differently from acting upon another emotion – greed. One could plausibly 
argue that greed is a more complicated emotion than love because greed 
requires calculation rather than merely acceptance. However, at base we have 
love and greed and these emotions are plainly fundamental to reasons for 
action; reasons for action depend upon them.  
                                                   
43 Joseph Raz Practical Reason and Norms (New Jersey: Princetown UP, 1990) pp 
15-16. It is necessary to quote two sections of the text in full because there are 
fundamental disagreements with Professor Raz‟s argument. See the comment at n 8 
above. 
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The second disagreement with Raz is that whilst it is true that a reason is 
used in evaluating John‟s behaviour, it is somewhat of an understatement to 
say that it is merely “referred to”. If John married Mary because he is a 
grasping gold digger rather than a lover, we are making an emotional 
evaluation of John. John, if he were – however unlikely this may be - open 
and honest about his veniality, is a corrupt and rotten person from whom we 
would instinctively recoil. “I only married Mary for her money, she means 
nothing to me, you can buy me if you pay Mary off and give me more” is 
hardly likely to endear him to us; whilst if Mary were to acquiesce in this 
behaviour saying “Yes, I know John doesn‟t love me. I just keep him on so I 
can use him for sex and chores; he‟s worth every penny”, it would lead most 
of us to shun them and reflect that perhaps they were just right for each other. 
No doubt some readers will now say - “but you are making a moral 
judgement about John and Mary‟s behaviour; if they wish to behave like 
whores, they should be free so to do; apart from which how do you know that 
their behaviour is wrong?” The simple answer to the question is because of 
my emotions which concur with the emotions of mature people. Here, plainly, 
the argument comes very close to that advanced by John Finnis,
44
 the 
difference between my argument and that advanced by Finnis is that he 
wrongly grounds his argument in reason rather than emotion.  The first 
sentence of the imaginary critique must also be answered. No doubt people 
should be free to act as they wish in their private lives and I might well take 
the tolerant view that, even though I find their behaviour sickening and wish 
to have nothing to do with John and Mary, they ought to be allowed to get on 
with their behaviour. Private lives of private people are personal matters and 
prying into them is no more than prurience.
45
  We think of John and Mary as 
emotionally abnormal, as deficient or crippled, and, if we are charitable or 
convinced that they got into this state because of some illness or accident, we 
might seek for ways to help them, but in the last analysis we should recognise, 
along with John Stuart Mill, that they are the best judges of their own lives. 
The most sophisticated and persuasive account of the relationship between 
the emotions and reason is that provided by David Hume.
46
 After showing that 
reason (properly so called) does not provide motivation or impetus for any 
action, but that it purely serves to provide the means to do that which we have 
already chosen to do and later describing reason as „the slave of the passions‟, 
he goes on to show how the „quiet passions‟ are easily confused with reason 
                                                   
44 See NLNR above n 8, pp 31-32, pp 102-103 and p 128 in his discussion of the 
spouadios where he refers to the root of his argument in Aristotle‟s Nichomachean 
Ethics in Bk1iii.  
45 This is no more than a restatement of JS Mill‟s harm principle. 
46 See David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature Part 3 Sec III “Of the Influencing 
Motives of the Will” http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm 
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but that the passions are fundamental. A simple thought experiment is helpful 
– ask yourself why you love your „real love‟.47  The question is unanswerable. 
John may have married Mary for her money and could only truthfully answer 
to that effect; he would be unable to explain why he loves, for example, Jane. 
He cannot go back further than „love‟. He can use it to explain his practical 
reason – why he has bought her jewellery – but he cannot resolve love further. 
He may be able to describe love more accurately in terms of mental, physical, 
physiological or biochemical effects, but he still cannot go beyond the 
emotion.  
Another example may be useful. In recent years the phrase “inappropriate 
touching” has gained currency. It is most often used to describe the wrongful 
touching by adults of children‟s sexual organs. It is suggested that the bland 
adjective “inappropriate” is wholly inappropriate. Whilst the preceding 
sentence is - to say the least – inelegant it is accurate. The second use of the 
word “inappropriate” identifies the first use as inaccurate or incorrect – it does 
not connote emotional evaluation.  It is more natural to describe such abuse as 
“revolting”, “disgusting” or, in the sense that it ought to give rise to shame on 
the part of the toucher, “shameful”. The coldness or lack of affect introduced 
by the phrase “inappropriate touching” reduces the wrongdoing to the level of 
a grammatical slip or minor traffic violation. One might almost think that the 
act was rendered less wrongful by the description than a breach of good 
manners because the judgement of manners involves the judgement of 
character. Hume asserts that certain passions or emotions are „implanted‟ into 
human nature and, whilst the use of that particular past participle is contested 
–„have evolved‟ is preferred – there is no reason to doubt that Hume is, in 
essence, correct.  
These emotions are basic and cannot be reduced to reason. Plainly such 
emotions have their „dark‟ mirror images – hate and so forth, but most of us 
can distinguish between the virtuous and the vicious emotions and can judge 
ourselves and others by them even in the face of confusion introduced by 
reason. Uniquely in the animal kingdom we enjoy recognisable emotional 
attachments to members of our own species, other species (our keeping of 
pets, our love of wildlife), inanimate objects (either as symbols, when we 
invest, eg, a wedding ring with sentimental value, or in themselves - “I love 
the countryside”) or countries and nations (such as in patriotism). Human 
beings do not only identify themselves as members of a species
48
, they 
identify themselves (at least in part) by means of their emotional relationships 
to animate and inanimate objects in the world.  
It is now time to pull the threads together: 
                                                   
47 Spouse, partner and so forth. 
48 See for a clear account of the elusive concept of species being, Jacob Held Marx via 
Feuerbach: Species-being Revisited (2009) 39 Idealistic Studies 137-148 
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1. Humans are not only rational beings, but also emotional beings. Our 
emotions are not some primitive element of our nature “left over” (as 
it were) from our animal past, but are a distinct and valuable facet of 
our human nature. 
2. Our emotions are at the root of our engagement with the world; they 
not only facilitate our understanding, interpretation, explanation and 
evaluation of ourselves, the human world and the world in general, 
they provide some ultimate and particularly powerful and inexplicable 
reasons for action. 
3. Emotions are „shared‟; we can understand another person‟s emotion; 
sometimes to the extent that powerful emotions such as love and our 
response to, or understanding of, death are fundamental to our culture. 
 
John Finnis points out that the whole point of law is to give effect to 
practical right-mindedness and to establish good and proper order amongst 
people and in individual conduct.
49
  Law can only have this effect where it 
takes account of our emotional nature. To a great extent it does so; 
demonstration of this fact extends to areas beyond the scope of the present 





Suppose that someone comes to a mature emotional decision to bring their 
life to an end and acts upon it. Albert Camus claims that suicide is the only 
important philosophical question;
50
 whilst one reading of this view and the 
arguments which led Camus to it, are strongly disputed below, it does imply 
one essential truth. Deliberate suicide is a uniquely human action. The 
implications of this are considered below.  
John Finnis seems to suggest that suicides should be resuscitated tout 
court; the author has even heard it suggested (by a very junior doctor) that the 
correct medical response would be to resuscitate a suicide and then apply for 
an order under s2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 since the person clearly 
constituted a danger to themselves. These are the responses of totalitarians if 
they are really advocating compulsion, or people afflicted with the worst kind 
of moral nosiness if they are simply interfering. The courts, thankfully, take 
from time to time a much more realistic and humane view. Firstly, we need to 
eliminate those cases in which a person is not able to come to a mature 
                                                   
49 See NLNR above n 8, p 18. 
50 Albert Camus The myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (trans Justin O‟Brien, 1955) 
http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/PhilTexts/Camus/Myth%20of%20Sisyphus-.pdf  
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decision. In the difficult case of A Local Authority v E and Others
51
 the High 
Court held, on the evidence that Ms E should be subjected to compulsory 
feeding because she had lost the capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, because she had become so incapacitated by her lack of nutrition and 
dependency upon alcohol and opiates, to make a proper decision for herself.  
On the other hand in Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust
52
 the High Court held 
that Ms B had the capacity to require that her artificial ventilation be 
discontinued and that she had been treated unlawfully during the time in 
which artificial ventilation had been imposed upon her.  
Ms B‟s case is possibly the most valuable in this area. Ms B was 43, well 
educated, and before her illness held a very senior position in a profession 
ancillary to medicine. She suffered two haemorrhages in her neck as a result 
of the malformation of some important blood vessels and was left with 
catastrophic injuries.  Despite excellent medical care she was left in the 




Her present situation is that she is paralysed from the neck down. She 
is conscious and capable of speech with the assistance of a speaking 
valve. She can move her head and use some of her neck muscles, but 
cannot move her torso, arms or legs at all. She is able to eat and drink. 
She is totally dependent on her carers, who feed, clothe and wash her 
and assist with her bodily functions. Her life is supported by artificial 
ventilation through a tracheostomy, a tube in her windpipe. Without 
the help of artificial ventilation, according to the medical evidence, 
she would have a less than 1% chance of independent ventilation, and 
death would almost certainly follow. 
 
Ms B wanted the ventilator switched off. She sought a declaration that the 
use of the ventilator keeping her alive constituted an unlawful trespass and 
sought (nominal) damages for trespass to the person. The Court accepted 
without serious question, though with a careful examination of the authorities, 
that a person has: 
 
an absolute right to refuse to consent to medical treatment for any 
reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even where that 
decision may lead to his or her own death
54
 
                                                   
51 [2012] EWCA 1639. 
52 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
53 [2002] EWHC 429 paragraph 38. 
54 See para 20 of the judgment referring to In re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 
2FLR 426, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital and the 
Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 and Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] 
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The only qualification placed on „person‟, and the point is crucial, is that 
such a person must be mentally competent. Most of the argument in Ms B‟s 
case concerned her mental competence, and once she had been held to be 




The most interesting point in Ms B‟s case is that death would follow 
rapidly upon switching off the ventilator. Brain damage occurs after three or 
four minutes of anoxia; this becomes permanent after about five minutes, and 
is invariably fatal within one quarter of an hour. One might reasonably expect 
that Ms B would be sedated whilst the machine was switched off and she 
died, rather than leave her body gasping automatically for breath whilst she 
was fully conscious. Whilst this would be briefly distressing for Ms B, 
although she would have no abiding memory of the pain, it would, 
undoubtedly be very distressing for the medical staff. The President averted to 
this fact when she said at paragraph 100 viii) that if the doctors concerned in 
the procedure to end Ms B‟s life had objections to it that it was the duty of the 




(a) Act/omission and Double Effect. 
 
There are three angles from which one could view the act of euthanasia: 
from that of the “victim”, that of the victim‟s loved ones and those who love 
him or her, and from the point of view of the “killers”.57 The President‟s last 
point above addresses the viewpoint of the “killers”. It has been suggested 
that there is a further dimension which ought to be taken into account – that of 
society at large. The reasons for this are not clear. In cases of euthanasia the 
only people directly affected are those listed above. It is quite different from 
                                                                                                                         
Fam 95. Further reference was made to a similar decision in Cruzan v Director, 
Missouri Department of Health (1990) 180 S. Ct .2841 
55 Those who wish to examine the legal principles set out in the case are referred to the 
useful guidance set out in paragraph 100. 
56 See paragraph 100 viii) 
57 The word “killers” and “kills” are used neutrally and provisionally. This accords 
with Michael Oakeshott‟s notion of “adverbial descriptions”. he points out that there 
is nothing wrong with killing per se – the fault lies in “killing murderously” It is 
accepted that some people may believe that „murder‟ is the more appropriate word in 
some of these instances, whilst others may prefer „ finally relieve their suffering‟. It is 
accepted that this use is controversial, but there is no other convenient term. If the 
reader thinks that emotive language is being used, the authors point is thereby 
conceded - valuation is a matter of emotion rather than reason. Oakeshott explains the 
use of “adverbial descriptions” in his On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). 
See the first essay “On the theoretical understanding of human conduct”.  
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abortion where there is the interest of another party -the foetus - to be 
considered and, as Blackmun J points out in Roe v Wade,
58
 the state does have 
a legitimate interest in speaking up for a party which cannot speak. Here, the 
state seems to be pushing its nose into a personal affair against the expressed 
wish of a party who is the only possible loser in the situation. The reason why 
some seek to invoke the public interest seems to be a „slippery slope‟ 
argument. If a person who really wants to die can be given, say, a lethal 
injection, what is to stop the next person who only nearly wants to die from 
being dispatched in the same way, and so on down the slope until we are 
killing those who do not want to die at all?  The way out of this problem is, it 
is suggested, simple. The draft Act set out below provides that the person who 
wishes to die is the only person who may bring the action. It is difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which a person who does not want to die brings an 
action and convinces a court that he desires his death does precisely that. As 
we shall see below the evidence from Ms B‟s case is that the slope runs quite 
the other way; some seek to prevent those who wish to die from having their 
wishes fulfilled by proposing quite extraordinary solutions.  
If the person who wishes to die is indeed gravely ill, is competent, is 
aware of the alternatives, and is of a settled mind, there seems to be nothing 
more to be said. These are matters which a court is admirably suited to judge, 
as evidenced by the Ms B case. One presumes that the person wishing to die 
has spoken to their family and friends and has taken some account of their 
views.
59
 This raises issues of competency and undue influence. Any court 
would want to be assured that there was no evidence that a person was being 
persuaded to die by, for example, avaricious relatives. 
The real issue arises with the state of mind or emotion of the killer. 
Clearly doctors do „kill‟ people from time to time. The abortionist „kills‟ an 
unborn child even where the treatment is designed to save the mother‟s life, 
and the doctor who obeys a „do not resuscitate‟ notice, or who decides to use 
the Liverpool Care Pathway as opposed to continuing with more aggressive 
treatments to keep the patient alive „kills‟ the patient in some sense.  
Furthermore the doctor who switches off the life-support machine having 
determined that the patient is -for all practical purposes
60
 - dead, is much more 
closely implicated in the person‟s death. All of these examples fall short of the 
deliberate killing of a patient by the administration of an overdose of hypnotic 
or pain relieving drugs. The question is how and why? 
                                                   
58 410 US 113 (1973), see VII and XI. 
59 Tony Nicklinson certainly discussed the matter with his family, so did Diane Pretty, 
and press reports indicate that the other anonymous applicant in Nicklinson‟s case 
discussed the matter with his wife. 
60 Such people are unable to speak, engage in voluntary movement, eat or drink, 
control their excretory functions, or breathe without support. 
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There are two alternative explanations which are normally used. The first 
explanation is the „doctrine of double effect‟. This doctrine is judged 
unsatisfactory. The classical example of the doctrine arises in the case of an 
abortion performed to save the life of the mother who will die if the abortion 
is not performed. Clearly abortion will kill the unborn child.
 61
 The doctrine of 
„double effect‟ seems to be given a wholly inappropriate name; it seems to be 
a doctrine of „half-think‟ or perhaps it is „think-too-much‟ This term („half-
think‟ or „think-too-much‟) needs to be explored. It has been suggested that 
the term „half-think‟ is unnecessarily pejorative – someone who half-thinks is, 
by implication, a half-wit. Stocker points out that “many contemporary 
ethicists, along with other contemporary philosophers, have lost sight of the 
evaluative importance of emotions and perhaps of emotions themselves.”  If 
„half-thinkers‟ are arrive at their position by neglecting their emotions, and it 
is not thought that they do, they would indeed be „half-thinkers‟. It seems that 
they „think-too-much‟ or reason-away their emotional repugnance by 
cleverness; a sophistication of thinking which enables the person to explain 
away, or justify, their performance of an action which they find repugnant  
The destruction of a baby in order to save the life of the mother cannot be 
regarded as two effects from a single action - one desirable (the deliberate 
saving of the life of the mother) and one undesirable (the deliberate killing of 
the baby). The saving of the mother‟s life requires the death of the baby, even 
though such a death is the very last thing that the physicians and the mother 
desired; they would go to nearly any lengths to save the baby‟s life. The so-
called doctrine of double-effect requires a sleight-of-mind.  The performer of 
the act is required to convince themselves that simply because it was the last 
thing that s/he would have desired to do that s/he did not, in fact, do it in any 
morally relevant sense. However this is simply „half-think‟ - the mother is 
alive, the baby is dead, the abortion was performed, but the abortionist was 
somehow missing. It is suggested that this only makes sense in two situations. 
The first situation is very familiar to those of religious faith. If God is waiting 
                                                   
61 There is another kind of double-think going on in the matter of abortion. It is 
unclear whether it is the pro- or anti- abortion lobby (or both) which engage in this 
behaviour. Those who oppose abortion often refer to the foetus (I am here using the 
correct scientific term in a neutral way) as a “baby” or “an unborn child”, whilst those 
who support abortion refer to the unborn child as a “foetus” or “the product of 
conception”. The point is to either encourage emotional warmth - for we are revolted 
at the killing of a baby - or to produce emotional distance - “it is only a bundle of 
cells, not a real child”. For a more detailed treatment of this issue in wider 
circumstances, see Jonathan Glover Humanity: a Moral History of the Twentieth 
Century (London: Pimlico, 2001) chapter 35. Arguably one could explain a great deal 
of Glover‟s work by adopting the theory set out here and in Valuing Emotions by 
simply pointing out the Glover‟s 20th century monsters (Hitler, Stalin and the rest) 
simply suppressed their emotions in a Nietzschean way. 
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beyond our physical life to judge the conscience of the abortionist and s/he is 
to be called upon to confess to murder in breach of, eg, the Biblical 
Commandment „Thou shalt not kill‟ s/he needs a convincing reason to absolve 
her from responsibility. Since those of faith believe that God is the final 
judge, and the author of absolute standards in this matter, they cannot quarrel 
with the rule, and we cannot convince them otherwise. The only route of 
escape is by saying that one should only be judged according to that which 
one desired to do and, since one did not desire to kill the baby, one is 
innocent.  
The second situation which may have more appeal for those without 
religious faith, and may well be adopted by those who judge the position from 
the perspective of the whole person as set out above is much more complex. It 
needs to be distinguished from the classical utilitarian position. A classical 
utilitarian would refer to „the greatest good of the greatest number‟ and would 
presumably decide to sacrifice the baby in most circumstances. Let us 
presume, for the sake of simplicity, in that case that the woman has a loving 
husband and other small children. If we add in the emotional nature of the 
abortionist-agent, we might not end up in the same position. Our designated 
abortionist might feel that s/he could not perform the operation because s/he 
would be so revolted by it. S/he might well say “I cannot kill an innocent 
baby.” The doctrine of half-think (think-too-much), or double-effect, then 
comes into play to save the abortionist from themselves. 
The same arguments apply with the act/omission doctrine. A physician 
might say, when faced with the decision to switch off a life-support machine, 
when without the support of the device the patient will inevitably die: a) “I 
will be damned if I kill the patient”, or b) “I cannot bear to kill the patient”.  
They would then „reach‟ for the act/omission doctrine and characterise their 
action as an omission. This, too, is half-think or think-too-much.   
The doctrines of double-effect or act/omission as they have been read in 
writing this essay depend crucially upon a rigid Humean approach to events 
caused by human action or inaction.
62
 Hume defines a cause as „an object 
precedent and contiguous to another and so united with it in the imagination, 
that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other and 
the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.”63 Both an 
„act‟ (such as injecting a person with a fatal dose of morphine) and an 
„omission‟ (switching off a life-support machine) qualify using this definition 
as the cause of a person‟s death, but we often draw a distinction between them 
calling one a (currently) culpable act and the other a (usually) non-culpable 
omission. This essay contains an implicit claim that the difference between 
                                                   
62 Nothing is said here about other instances of causation. 
63 See J L Mackie The Cement of the Universe; a Study of Causation (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1974) p 3. 
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the „act‟ and the „omission‟ is very much less than is commonly supposed and 
is best explained, in circumstances of assisted suicide at least (as opposed to 
the murder of an unwilling victim) as simply addressing the mental and moral 
hygiene of the killer. It is emotionally unpalatable to think of oneself as a 
murderer. One can avoid this shame by evaluating oneself as an „omitter‟ or 
as a „mercy-killer‟.  
There is another way out of the problem. It is to recognise that 
occasionally we are called upon to perform acts which are morally and 
emotionally unacceptable. Life is, from time to time, nasty; it is seldom, if 
ever, fair. One can simple take the view that one simply has to take the least 
unacceptable way forward; we have to muddle through somehow.
64
 
Perhaps one way of doing this is in the case of the critically ill patient in 
the situation of Mr Nicklinson and listens to the patient saying “I am going to 
die soon, I cannot bear to continue with this miserable existence” one could 
take the view of the merciful gods in the story of Baucis and Philemon.
65
 
Baucis and Philemon could not bear the thought of one living beyond the life 
of the other – for such would be a miserable existence beyond their emotional 
capacity - and asked the gods as a reward for their kindness to be allowed to 
die together.
66
 Here we are dealing with a single death, not a suicide pact, but 
we can just the same recognise that death - like everything else - has its 
season. Suppose that one has had a hitherto happy and active life and this has 
been blighted with a disease such that one cannot do all that makes life worth 
living and one is reduced to dependence upon others for even the simplest or 
most intimate of tasks. One might then, in a mature emotional way, seek 
oblivion rather than endure further pain, distress, and, it has to be said, shame. 
It is not doubted that some people, for example, those who work in 
hospices, derive great satisfaction from caring for the terminally ill. Indeed 
some of these people speak as if their emotional commitment to the dying 
                                                   
64 This point is made in the poignant wartime song from Meet Me in St Louis (MGM, 
1943), “Have Yourself a Merry Little Christmas” (Hugh Martin & Ralph Blane) as 
sung by Judy Garland. The exact lines are “Someday soon we all will be together, if 
the fates allow. Until then we‟ll have to muddle through somehow.” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yudgy30Dd68. Rather than focusing upon the 
(rather mawkish) story of the film; readers are invited to consider the effect of the 
song upon the wartime servicemen and women and their families. These particular 
words were found to be so powerful that they were rewritten for later renditions of the 
song. Sometimes we are faced with impossible situations and all we can do is “muddle 
through somehow”.  
65 See above n 40. 
66 In the case of our dying patient we can now recognise that the „gods‟ in the story of 
Baucis and Philemon were wholly mythical; they were supernatural representations of 
that which seems like a natural and normal human response to many people. 
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amounts to a vocation. It is as if the other side of the emotional coin to 
refusing to kill is a commitment to keep someone alive for as long as possible. 
There is no shortage of suffering people and some of them may well wish to 
live out every last moment of their lives tended by hospice workers. However, 
those who wish to die are surely under no obligation to provide them with 
patients. Do those who work in hospices or intensive therapy units actively 
seek people for whom to care? To answer this question in the positive sounds 
almost absurd; could anyone really want to care for someone living a life 
which they want to lose? In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust, one of the 
witnesses, Mr G (a consultant in spinal medicine) argued that Ms B should not 
be allowed to bring her life to an end with assistance because she lacked the 
capacity to form a judgement.
67
  
Mr G argued that Ms B did not realise just how good life could be for a 
person who was in the state described above. If he was able to persuade her to 
enter a specialist therapy unit and live there for a period of two years, his 
experience was that many people came to recognise that they were, in fact, 
living a worthwhile life. Mr G wanted the Court to declare that Ms B was not 
competent to decide the issue of her own life because she had not had the 
benefit of this two years of experience. It is argued that Mr G was seeking to 
impose the sentence of the gods upon Sisyphus upon the unfortunate Ms B. 
As Camus helpfully summarises:
68
 “The gods had condemned Sisyphus to 
ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would 
fall back of its own weight.” In Sisyphus‟ case the gods had thought that there 
could be “no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labour”.  This 
point needs exploration in depth but there is a preliminary point concerning 
Ms B‟s autonomy. Ms B was a highly qualified, highly experienced, senior 
social worker in the NHS with an excellent understanding of her condition 
and her prognosis, she had received the offer of Mr G‟s care and had decided 
to reject it. For it to be claimed that she was thereby incompetent to decide 
upon her life is quite extraordinary and represents that which it is tempting to 
describe as a totalitarian attitude – “you do not agree with that which I think is 
best for you, therefore you must be incompetent”.69  
                                                   
67 See paragraphs 59-63 of the judgment. 
68 The opening sentence of the final part of the essay, above n 5.  
69 If it is thought that this is hyperbole, see Robert van Voren “Political abuse of 
psychiatry - an historical overview”, Schizophrenia Bulletin 36(1) 33-35. Van Voren 
writes “The political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union originated from the 
concept that persons who opposed the Soviet regime were mentally ill because there 
was no other logical explanation why one would oppose the best sociopolitical system 
in the world.” By this reasoning, if wishing to die is incapable of logical explanation 
anyone who wishes to die is clearly incompetent. That is a totalitarian attitude. 
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There may be more reputable ways to justify a decision to refuse to allow 
treatment to be withdrawn from Ms B and thus killing her.
70
  The first such 
argument is rejected in its entirety. It is of the form – “god judges us by our 
reaction to trying events such as strokes and major illnesses” – since the 
author rejects the notion of an external judge of our lives, this makes no sense. 
The second such argument is that advanced by Camus. Camus suggests that 
Sisyphus is made happy by enduring the struggle in an absurd world. Camus 
might have Sisyphus say: “Pushing the rock up the hill requires effort and by 
performing this meaningless task I can take pride in my strength and fortitude. 
I am happy. ” This is, of course, a wholly emotional reaction and one could 
understand Ms B, or any other person, taking the view that their own strength 
would carry them through.
71
 This would suggest that a person who decided to 
bring their life to an end in Ms B‟s situation is no more than a coward. Before 
jumping to such a conclusion we should, of course, be thankful that we are not 
ourselves in such an unhappy situation having to face the hourly indignity of 
having to be given nutrient (not tasty, life-enhancing, emotionally satisfying, 
food or drink), having our nosed wiped, and having to be cleaned after soiling 
ourselves. Would we be surprised if our pride and courage in existence was 
overcome by shame?   
However there is a much more positive argument to be made. It may be 
thought that the person wants to die in order to bring their shame to an end or 
because they are a coward, but suppose, in the alternative, that the person 
wants to die because they are so warmly and passionately attached to life that 
they cannot bear to be reduced to the status of a spectator. To a limited extent 
one can see Sisyphus‟ pride in carrying on because he is, at least, doing 
something. However, one essential element of living is making a contribution 
to the lives of others, and Ms B would be prevented from doing that. She 
would lose the emotional satisfaction which comes from all the „jobs well 
done‟ for others. Another essential element of living is the ability to plan 
one‟s own life; a person in Ms B‟s situation would be unable to make even the 
simplest plan for herself. Suppose that Ms B had, shortly before her second, 
disabling bleed planted a hyacinth bulb in her garden. For the rest of us we 
could, at the prompting of a stray thought, wonder at the progress of this 
flower and, opening the door, slip down the steps to examine it. “Here it is, 
bright blue and sweetly scented in the spring sunshine ... and the leaf buds are 
breaking on the bushes, ... and a robin is singing … Look! There he is … on 
                                                   
70 Recall that the arguments set out above are that 1. She would need to be sedated 
before the life-support machine was switched off, and 2. The difference between act 
and omission is illusory in fact and can only be understood from the emotional 
standpoint of the „killer‟. 
71 The clearest musical example of such an emotion is Frank Sinatra‟s rendition of the 
famous song written by Jacques Revaux and Paul Anka My Way. 
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the lilac… which is coming back to life. We might say “I planted that, and in 
the autumn I will plant another.” These plans and these happened-upon sights, 
smells, and sounds are now beyond Ms B. We might well call our partner to 
look and then caress and share in the spring morning. This is not for Ms B, 
she has only the life-support machine. If this story were told by some more 
skilled story-teller and thus the imagination of the reader was provoked and an 
affect raised, the reader‟s eyes would have moistened with tears. That is life 
and the key to understanding it is emotion. Can we really be surprised if some 
people would rather bring their diminished, life-supported, existence to a 
close?   
The explanations of why Camus is wrong, why the atheist is not a nihilist, 
and why it is right in the circumstances faced by Ms B, Nicklinson, and others 
to bring their existence to a peaceful and speedy end at their request now 
come together. Camus is wrong, because life is not absurd or meaningless, it 
has value when experienced from the inside; our emotions give it value. Value 
is „in here‟ because we feel it. Camus gives his argument away when he 
acknowledges the final pride and joy of Sisyphus in spitting in the eye of the 
condemnatory gods. “Here is the worst you could do and I can beat you.” 
There is no need of any external source of value such as a god if we can judge 
things internally by our emotion. Finally, if (and Tony Nicklinson, Diane 
Pretty and Ms B had clearly reached that stage) our emotional fires have burnt 
so low that all value has drained from our lives; it is argued that it cannot be 
wrong for someone just to douse the guttering flame. 
How can we bring this about in legal form? How can we allow a person to 
bring about their death in the circumstances which they choose, free from the 
worry that they will be coerced into death, and such that physicians may 
decline to kill patients. The following Draft Act is proposed. It is argued that 
it is a true norm because it reflects the realities of the human condition. 
 
THE DRAFT ACT  
 
It is proposed that Parliament should enact a short Act in the following 
form. This is intended to address the point made at the end of Nicklinson 
where the Court felt constrained from issuing a Declaration in the absence of 
an Act permitting authorising such an action. 
 
1. It shall be lawful for a medical practitioner to administer an approved 
fatal injection of suitable drugs to a person (“the patient”) in the 
following circumstances 
1) Where the patient concerned is suffering from: 
a) A scheduled disease or medical condition, or, 
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b) Any other condition such that their capacity to breath, eat, 
drink, or voluntarily retain or void bodily waste can only be 
maintained by artificial means or constant care and 
intervention, and is unlikely to improve, and the High Court 
has issued a Declaration to the appropriate Health Authority 
that the administration of such an injection will be lawful. 
 
1. The High Court may issue such a Declaration upon the application of 
a patient suffering from a disease or medical condition set out in 
section 1 where 
a) The patient has suffered from such a disease for a period of 
twelve months preceding the date of such Application, and  
b) That the Court is satisfied that the patient has the capacity to 
make such an application and understands its import, and 
c) The court is satisfied that the patient‟s decision is made of 
their own free will and is not subject to duress or the undue 
influence of another in coming to the decision to seek a 
Declaration, and 
d) The Court is satisfied that the alternatives to an immediate 
death have been explained to the patient. 
 
1. The patient may represent themselves or be represented by Counsel. 
The Secretary of State shall appoint the Official Solicitor to represent 
the interests of the Respondent Health Authority in ensuring that the 
criteria set out in Section 2 are fulfilled. Argument shall be limited to 
those matters contained in Section 2. above. No interventions in such 
proceedings will be permitted  
 
2. If such Declaration is issued it will be the duty of the Respondent 
Health Authority to provide a doctor willing to administer the 
injection.  
1) No doctor may be obliged to administer such an injection against 
their will or conscience and any doctor shall have an absolute and 
unquestionable discretion to refuse to administer such an 
injection. 
2) The identity of the doctor shall be protected from publication by 
Injunction and shall only be disclosed to the patient and their 
immediate family. 
 
1. Schedules to this Act shall contain  
1) The formulations of such drugs as are approved to constitute the 
fatal injection. 
2) The list of scheduled diseases. 
RIGHT TO DIE 
 114 
 
A short explanation of this Act is required. Firstly it is intended that the 
Act is only intended for use where a person is disabled by a serious disease 
where there is no reasonable hope of recovery. It would be unconscionable for 
the state to provide facilities for, or co-operate in, the suicide of a person who 
was able to act for themselves because the opportunities for abuse are too 
great. This further explains why, at section 2, it is necessary for the person 
who wishes to die to bring their own application. In part this rule is intended 
to prevent opponents of the Act from bringing applications designed to bring 
the matter into disrepute. The issue of capacity must be introduced to prevent 
those whose illness is such that they lack capacity (such as the unfortunate Ms 
E) are unable to use the Act.  
The requirement that the person make the application of their own free 
will is designed both to preclude the applicant being pressured to bring their 
life to an end against their will and to ensure that the person has themselves 
determined that their will to live is at an end. 
It is clear, for the reasons set out above, that some doctors may have an 
objection to bringing another‟s life to a close. Perhaps they are religious, 
perhaps their emotions inhibit them, perhaps they are unconvinced by the 
arguments for euthanasia. It should be their absolute right to refuse. However 
there are doctors who are willing to provide the necessary expertise. 
The rule against interventions is designed to protect the person who 
wishes to die from the attentions of zealots who understand the world in a 
quite different way. Similarly the injunction to protect the identity of the 
doctor is designed to free him or her from the threat of lawsuits or even, rather 
ironically, unlawful violence. Most acts of domestic, as opposed to 







This article contains the argument that we only make sense of our lives 
and our deaths by means of emotion. We are not wholly rational creatures and 
indeed our lives would be much the poorer if we were only actuated by 
reason. The author of this paper currently enjoys the best of health and wishes 
such to continue for as long as possible. However, he knows that sooner or 
later his health will decline and he will die - to every thing there is a season … 
a time to be born and a time to die. Such is the nature of human life. There 
were countless ages before he was born and there will be countless ages after 
he dies. The writing of philosophy always serves some purpose. It is not an 
                                                   
72 M Jacobson and H Royer "Aftershocks: The Impact of Clinic Violence on Abortion 
Services" [2011] 3 (1) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 189–223. 
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empty academic exercise, the author often wants to change the world,
73
 or, at 
the very least to explain his or her own position within it.  
A person writing about emotion must be taken to want to explain their 
own emotions. Suppose that tomorrow the author were to suffer a stroke, and 
he be left tetraplegic, unable to eat or drink, and incontinent. His own wish in 
that horrible situation is for his wife to sit with him and for him to receive 
such an injection. The words of Rupert Brooke in Choriambics sum up his 
feelings: 
 
Only at length, dear, when the great day ends, 
When love dies with the last light, and the last song has been sung, and 
friends 
All are perished, and gloom strides on the heaven: then, as alone I lie, 
‟Mid Death‟s gathering winds, frightened and dumb, sick for the past, 
may I 
Feel you suddenly there, cool at my brow; then may 
I hear the peace 
Of your voice at the last, whispering love, calling, ere all can cease 
In the silence of death; then may I see dimly, and know, a space, 
Bending over me, last light in the dark, once, as of old, your face. 
 
Why should we deny any human being that release? To condemn them to 
a twilight non-life is, in the view of the author, simply wicked. 
 
                                                   
73 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Xth thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach, Appendix to 
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1988). 
